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Abstract
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to con-
tribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this
paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where
players are networked and each has binary actions, and focus
on the algorithmic aspects of such games. First, we show that
checking the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
is NP-Complete. We then identify tractable instances based
on restrictions of either utility functions or of the underlying
graphical structure. In certain cases, we also show that we
can efficiently compute a socially optimal Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we propose a heuristic approach for computing ap-
proximate equilibria in general binary networked public goods
games, and experimentally demonstrate its effectiveness.
1 Introduction
Public goods games have been a major subject of inquiry
as a natural way to model the tension between individual
interest and social good [14, 20]. In a canonical version of
such games, individuals choose the amount to invest in a
public good, and the subsequent value of the good, which
is determined by total investment of the community, is then
shared equally by all. A number of versions of this game have
been studied, including variants where players are situated
on a network, with individual payoffs determined solely by
the actions of their network neighbors [3].
An important variation of networked public goods games
treats investment decisions as binary [11]. One motivating
example is crime reporting, known to vary widely, with
the general observation that crime is considerably under-
reported [19]. In a game theoretic abstraction of crime re-
porting, individuals choose whether or not to report crimes,
and benefits accrue to the broader community, for example,
causing a reduction in overall crime rate. Another example
of binary public goods games is vaccination. In this exam-
ple, parents decide whether to vaccinate their children, with
herd immunity becoming the public good. To keep terminol-
ogy general, we will refer to the binary decision whether or
not to invest in a public good (thus, reporting a crime and
vaccinating are forms of such investment).
A special case of binary public goods games (BNPGs),
commonly known as best-shot games, has received some
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prior attention [7, 11, 15, 17]. However, best-shot games
make a strong assumption about the structure of the player
utility functions. While Levit et al. [17] recently showed that
equilibria for best-shot games can be computed in polyno-
mial time by best response dynamics, these may fail to find
social welfare-optimal equilibria, and nothing is known about
BNPGs more generally.
We study the problem of computing pure strategy Nash
equilibria in general binary public goods games on networks.
We provide examples to show that a pure strategy Nash equi-
libria is not guaranteed to exist for general BNPGs. Further-
more, we show that even determining if a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exists is hard in general. However, while pure
strategy equilibria need not in general exist, and are hard to
compute, we exhibit a number of positive results for impor-
tant special cases. One class of special cases pertains to bi-
nary public goods games for completely connected networks
(communities), in which case an equilibrium can be found
efficiently if it exists. Similarly, we can efficiently find a pure
strategy equilibrium in general BNPGs when the graph is a
tree. If we further restrict the externalities to have an identical
impact on all players (we call this the homogeneous case), we
can characterize all pure strategy equilibria, and efficiently
compute a socially optimal equilibrium. Moreover, if both
investment costs and externalities are identical (termed the
fully homogeneous case), we can characterize all pure strat-
egy equilibria for arbitrary networks. Finally, we present
a heuristic approach for finding approximate equilibria to
tackle general BNPGs, and experimentally demonstrate that
it is highly effective. Our algorithmic results are summarized
in Table 1.
Related Work Our work relates to the broad literature on
graphical games, a succinct representation of games in which
utilities exhibit local dependences captured by a graph [13].
[9, 8, 12] studied the complexity of computing (mixed-
strategy) equilibria in graphical games with utilities defined
in the matrix form, and proposed efficient algorithms to find
equilibria on graphs with restricted topologies.
Networked public goods games can be regarded as a spe-
cial class of graphical games where the utilities are functions
of the accumulated efforts of individuals. A number of model
variations have been proposed to study public goods in dif-
ferent fields such as economics, innovation diffusion, and
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
05
78
8v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
9 N
ov
 20
19
medical research [10, 22, 5]. Our model is closely related to
that proposed by Bramoullé and Kranton [3]. The two quali-
tative distinctions are that (a) we consider binary investment
decisions, in contrast to Bramoullé and Kranton, who focus
on the more traditional continuous investment model, and
(b) Bramoullé and Kranton assume homogeneous concave
utilities, while we consider a more general setting.
Other related variations of graphical games include super-
modular network games [18] and best-shot games [7, 11, 15,
17]. The latter are a special case of BNPGs, and Levit et
al. [17] recently showed that these are potential games with
better response dynamics converging to a pure strategy equi-
librium in polynomial time. No other algorithmic results are
known for either of these special classes of graphical games.
general complete graph tree
heterogeneous hard poly poly
homogeneous hard poly poly
fully-homogeneous hard poly poly
fully-homogeneous + convex g poly poly poly
Table 1: An overview of our results.
2 Model
A Binary Networked Public Goods game (henceforth BNPG
game) is characterized by a graph G = (V,E), where the
node set V = {1, 2, · · · , n} denotes the players and E =
{(i, j)|i, j ∈ V } represents the interdependencies among
the players’ payoffs, a binary strategy space xi ∈ {0, 1} for
each player i (we can think of these as decisions whether
to invest in a public good), and a collection of utility func-
tions Ui(x1, . . . , xn). These utility functions have special
structure, which we now describe, and we use the running
example of crime reporting to illustrate the intuition behind
this structure.
Let Ni = {j 6= i|(j, i) ∈ E} be the set of neighbors
of i, and define ni =
∑
j∈Ni xj , or equivalently, ni is the
number of i’s network neighbors who choose to invest (note
the implicit dependence of ni on the strategies of i’s neigh-
bors). Thus, in the crime reporting scenario, ni represents
the number of i’s neighbors who report crimes. We assume
that each player gains whenever more people invest (report
crimes), for example, because as a result crime rate drops. On
the other hand, reporting crime is costly (time consuming, or
even dangerous). We capture the latter feature by introducing
a cost ci which is incurred whenever i invests in a public
good. Player i’s utility function is then defined as
Ui(xi, ni) = gi(xi + ni)− cixi, (1)
where gi(xi + ni) ≥ 0 captures the positive externality of
investment choices by i’s neighbors, such as the benefits to
an individual when their neighbors report crimes. The only
restriction we impose on gi(x) at this point is that they are
non-decreasing functions in x (e.g., higher reporting reduces
crime rate). Our definition of gi(·) generalizes the one given
by Bramoullé and Kranton 2007, who assume that gi(·) is
a twice differentiable strictly concave function. There are
many scenarios these assumptions are violated. For example,
studies of incentives in P2P systems entail natural models
in which gi(·) is an S-shaped function [4]; commonly con-
sidered best-shot games model gi(·) as a step function [11];
and gi(·) may be convex as in models of social unrest [6].
However, our definition of gi(·) is flexible enough to model
the aforementioned scenarios. Note that the size of BNPG
representation is O(n2) for an arbitrary gi(·). A useful ob-
servation is that player i chooses to invest if and only if
Ui(1, ni) ≥ Ui(0, ni), which can be rewritten as
ci ≤ gi(ni + 1)− gi(ni) ∆= ∆gi(ni). (2)
As each player has a different mapping function gi(·), we
henceforth call the general version of this game a heteroge-
neous BNPG game. We will study several important special
cases. The first is when the externality function g(·) is the
same for all players, which we term a homogeneous BNPG
game. The second is a further restriction of a homogeneous
game where all players have identical costs ci = c; we term
this a fully homogeneous BNPG game. The best-shot games,
which received some prior attention, are a special case of
homogeneous BNPGs with gi(xi + ni) = min{K,xi + ni}
for some integer K.
We use (G,U) to parametrize a BNPG game with underly-
ing graph G and a set of utility functions U = {Ui}i∈V .
We seek pure-strategy Nash Equilibria (PSNE) x∗ =
(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) of the game. Let x denote the action profile
for all players, and let x−i denote the joint actions of all the
players other than player i.
Definition 2.1. In a BNPG game (G,U), a pure-strategy
Nash Equilibrium is a vector x∗ ∈ {0, 1}n satisfying
Ui(x
∗
i , n
∗
i ) ≥ Ui(xi, n∗i ) for any xi, where n∗i =
∑
j∈Ni x
∗
j .
3 Heterogeneous BNPG Games
Existence and Complexity
We begin by asking basic questions about BNPG games: is
a PSNE guaranteed to exist, and if not, is it hard to check
whether one exists?
Existence of PSNE We first show that a PSNE need not exist
even if the network is a complete graph. Consider a game with
two players A and B. Let UA(xA, xB) = gA(xA + xB) −
cAxA and UB(xB , xA) = gB(xB + xA) − cBxB be the
utilities of A and B, respectively. A sufficient condition un-
der which PSNE does not exist is that UB(0, 0) < UB(1, 0)
and UA(0, 1) < UA(1, 1) and UB(1, 1) < UB(0, 1) and
UA(1, 0) < UA(0, 0). This condition can be achieved by
choosing gA(·) and gB(·) such that ∆gA(0) = cA − ,
∆gA(1) = cA+, ∆gB(0) = cB+, and ∆gB(1) = cB−,
where  is a positive constant. A possible configuration is that
gA(0) = , gA(1) = cA, gA(2) = 2cA + , and gB(0) = ,
gB(1) = cB + 2, gB(2) = 2cB + , where  ≤ cA and
 ≤ cB , ensuring that both gA and gB are non-decreasing.
Complexity Next, we show that determining the existence
of PSNE is hard.
Theorem 1. Determining the existence of a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in a BNPG game is NP-Complete.
Proof. Given an action profile, it takes polynomial time to
check if it is a PSNE, so the problem is in NP. We construct a
reduction from the INDEPENDENT SET (IS) problem. Given
a graph G, the IS problem is to decide whether there is an
independent set S of size at least k in G.
Given an instance of IS (i.e., a graph G = (V ′, E) and an
integer k), we construct a new graphH = (V,E) by adding
an additional node t and connecting t to every node in G, that
is V = V ′ ∪ {t}. We define the best-response policy of the
players as the following:
i ∈ V ′ : xi =
{
1, ni = 0
0, ni 6= 0 and xt =
{
1, 0 < nt < k
0, nt = 0 or nt ≥ k.
(3)
Note that by choosing different functions gi, the best-
response policy above are always realizable. A heterogeneous
BNPG is defined on the graphH, with the best-response poli-
cies defined above. We now show that finding an independent
set of size at least k in graph G is equivalent to finding a
PSNE of the game.
First, suppose we have found an independent set S of size
k. Then node t is not in S since t connects to every node in
G. We check the remaining nodes in V \ S and iteratively
add into S those nodes that have no connections to any node
in S, which results in Sˆ. Note that Sˆ is maximal and its size
is at at least k. We argue that all nodes in Sˆ choosing 1 and
the rest of the nodes choosing 0 is an equilibrium. For a node
in Sˆ, it will not deviate since none of its neighbors chooses 1.
For node t, it will not deviate since it has at least k neighbors
that choose 1. For a node u ∈ V \ Sˆ, it must connect to at
least one node in Sˆ; otherwise Sˆ is not maximal. Thus u will
also not deviate.
Second, suppose we have found an equilibrium. There
must be some nodes choosing 1 in the equilibrium, otherwise
for any node in G it has no investing neighbor and it would
deviate to choose 1. If the equilibrium is that all nodes choose
1, we have nt < k since t chooses 1. Because t connects to
all nodes in G, which indicates that nt = |V | < k. So the
equilibrium cannot be that all nodes choose 1. Suppose in
the equilibrium the nodes are divided into two sets S and T
where nodes in S choose 1 and nodes in T choose 0. Further
note that t cannot be in S. Because another node in S would
prefer to choose 0 as it connects to t. Thus, the nodes in S
form an independent set. For a node u in T , it must be true
that u connects to at least one node in S since u chooses 0.
Furthermore, t choosing 0 means that the size of S is at least
k. Thus, the set S is an independent set of G with size at least
k.
Since determining existence of a PSNE is hard in general
BPNG games, we next consider tractable special cases.
Games on Complete Graphs Consider the case where G is
a complete graph. Remarkably, despite the fact that a PSNE
need not exist even in this special case, we now show that
we can find one (if it exists) or confirm non-existence in
polynomial time. Define α(k) and β(k) as follows:
α(k) :=
∣∣{i|ci < ∆gi(k − 1)}∣∣
β(k) :=
∣∣{i|ci > ∆gi(k − 1)}∣∣
0 < k ≤ n,
(4)
where α(k) (resp. β(k)) is the number of players who will
always invest (resp. not invest) if the total of k players invest.
The following proposition is then immediate.
Proposition 2. There exists a PSNE if and only if there exists
0 < k ≤ n such that α(k) ≤ k ≤ n− β(k).
The condition in Prop. 2 suggests the following algorithm
to compute a PSNE, or prove that one doesn’t exist. When
k = 0, there is a PSNE if and only if the set
{
i|ci < ∆gi(0)
}
is empty, which and can be checked in O(n) time. When
k 6= 0, for each integer k = 1, . . . , n, check if the condition
in Prop. 2 holds, which takes O(n2) time. Thus, the full
algorithm has running time of O(n2).
Games on Trees Another important special case is when G
is a tree. We now present a polynomial-time algorithm to
compute a PSNE on trees (or conclude one does not exist).
Suppose an action profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) is given. Con-
sider a sub-tree denoted by GT = (VT , ET ). Observe that x
is a PSNE if and only if the actions restricted to the sub-tree,
namely {x∗i |i ∈ VT }, form a (local) PSNE of the BNPG
played on GT . This indicates that a PSNE on G can be con-
structed from those (local) PSNE on sub-trees. Our algorithm,
TreePSNE, is inspired by TreeNash Kearns, Littman, and
Singh 2013, but unlike the latter, it computes an exact PSNE
(rather than an approximate mixed Nash equilibrium) in poly-
nomial time, as formalized by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. When G is a tree, it takes O(dmax · |V |+ |E|)
time to compute a PSNE or conclude that one does not exist,
where dmax is the maximum degree of G.
Proof. We give a constructive proof of Theorem 3. Given
a tree G, we denote its root by R (the choice of the root is
arbitrary). Suppose G is an inverted tree, where the root R is
at the bottom and the leaves at the top. The nodes in G are
categorized into three classes: leaf nodes, internal nodes, and
the root. Our algorithm consists of two passes: a downstream
pass and an upstream pass. In the downstream pass we tra-
verse the nodes in a depth-first order (start with the leaves
and end at the root). Each leaf or internal node passes a table
to its parent. We call the table conditional best-response table
since it contains the best responses of a node conditioned on
its parent’s actions and equilibrium actions of its children.
Before presenting the algorithm, we define n′Y=1 (resp.
n′Y=0) as the number of node Y ’s children that invest in a
PSNE of the associated subtree given that Y invests (resp.
not invests). Let W and Y be a pair of nodes, where W is
the parent of Y . Denote their action profile as (xW , xY ). The
necessary condition that (xW , xY ) is part of a PSNE is in
Eq. (5), where the “” is “≥” if xY = 1 and “≤” otherwise.
∆gY (n
′
Y=xY + xW︸ ︷︷ ︸
=nY
)  cY , (5)
Suppose Y is a leaf node and W is its parent. Since Y
does not have any child, n′Y is always zero no matter what
Y ’s decision is. Thus, computing the table is equivalent to
identify the action profiles (xW , xY ) such that they satisfy
Eq. (5), which takes O(1) time since there are at most four
combinations of (xW , xY ). If no (xW , xY ) satisfies Eq. (5),
we conclude a PSNE does not exist for the game. The proce-
dure to compute the conditional best-response table for a leaf
node Y is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Compute conditional best-response table TY
for a leaf node
1: Input: ∆gY (·), cY
2: Initialize: TY
3: for (xW , xY ) in (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) do
4: if xY = 0 then
5: If ∆gY (xW ) ≤ cY then put (xW , xY ) into TY end if
6: else if xY = 1 then
7: If ∆gY (xW ) ≤ cY then put (xW , xY ) into TY end if
8: end if
9: end for
10: if TY = ∅ then
11: Return No PSNE exists
12: else
13: Return TY
14: end if
U1
xY = 1→ xU1 = 0
xY = 0→ xU1 = 1
. . . Uk
xY = 1→ xUk = 1
xY = 1→ xUk = 0
xY = 0→ xUk = 1
Y
W
Figure 1: Conditional best-response table for internal nodes
U1, . . . , Uk.
Now we consider an internal node Y . Suppose its parent
is W and it has k children U1, . . . , Uk. For the purpose of
induction, suppose the conditional best-response tables of
U1, . . . , Uk have been passed to Y . An example is showed
in Figure 1, where the two tables beside U1 and Uk indicate
the best responses of the two nodes conditioned on their
parent node Y ’s actions. We need to check if there is a an
action profile (xW , xY ) satisfying Eq. (5), which requires
us to compute n′Y . Note that there may be ties, where a
player is indifferent between investing and not investing given
its parent’s action. For example, in Figure 1 the right table
indicates that node Uk is indifferent between xUk = 1 and
xUk = 0, given xY = 1.
Let dmax be the maximum degree of G. When xY = 0,
we denote the number of Y ’s children that always choose
to invest (resp. not invest) as n1Y=0 (resp. n
0
Y=0). To com-
pute n1Y=0 (resp. n
0
Y=0), we iterate through the conditional
best-response tables of U1, . . . , Uk and count the number
of children that have unique best response xUi = 1 (resp.
xUi = 0) given xY = 0. This step takes O(dmax). Note that
n1Y=0 + n
0
Y=0 ≤ k, since Y has k children. Thus, the pos-
sible values of n′Y=0 are {n1Y=0, n1Y=0 + 1, . . . , k − n0Y=0}.
We obtain possible values of n′Y=1 given xY = 1 using the
similar procedure. Finally, we substitute the four combina-
tions of (xW , xY ), as well as the corresponding values of
n′Y that condition on xY , into Eq.(5), which identifies the
(xW , xY ) that can be part of a PSNE. If no (xW , xY ) satis-
fies Eq. (5), we conclude a PSNE does not exist for the game.
The procedure to compute the conditional best-response table
for an internal node Y is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Compute conditional best-response table TY
for an internal node
1: Input: ∆gY (·), cY , k and conditional best-response ta-
bles TUi , . . . , TUk
2: Initialize: TY
3: Compute n1Y=0, n
0
Y=0, n
1
Y=1, n
0
Y=1
4: for (xW , xY ) in (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) do
5: if xY = 0 then
6: for n′Y=0 in {n1Y=0, . . . , k − n0Y=0} do
7: if ∆gY (n′Y=0 + xW ) ≤ cY then
8: Put (xW , xY ) into TY
9: end if
10: end for
11: else if xY = 1 then
12: for n′Y=1 in {n1Y=1, . . . , k − n0Y=1} do
13: if ∆gY (n′Y=1 + xW ) ≥ cY then
14: Put (xW , xY ) into TY
15: end if
16: end for
17: end if
18: end for
19: if TY = ∅ then
20: Return No PSNE exists
21: else
22: Return TY
23: end if
We can compute the best response table of R in O(dmax)
using a slightly modified version of Algorithm 2.; if the
table is empty, we can conclude that no PSNE exists. Thus,
computing the conditional best-response tables for all nodes
takes O(dmax|V |) time. In addition, it takes O(|V |+ |E|) to
obtain the depth-first order. Thus, the downstream pass takes
O(dmax|V |+ |E|) time.
In what follows we show that the downstream pass does
not miss any PSNE if there is one, by an inductive argument.
Suppose there is a PSNE that is missed by the downstream
pass. Then we must wrongly conclude that no PSNE exists
at some node Y as we move downward. First, the node Y
cannot be a leaf node, since we exhaustively check the four
possible action profiles of Y and its parent. Next, suppose the
PSNE is not missed until an internal node Y . Since the PSNE
is not missed by any child of Y , we must miss an action
profile (xY , xW ) of Y and its parent that satisfies Eq. (5).
However, we check all combinations of n′Y , xY , and xW ,
so we cannot miss such an action profile, which leads to a
contradiction. The same argument applies for the root R.
In the upstream pass we traverse G in a reversed depth-first
order (start at the root and end the leaves). We first select
the action of the root. If both xR = 0 and xR = 1 are R’s
best responses, we arbitrarily pick one. Next, we sequentially
determine each node’s action based on its parent’s action and
the conditional best-response table passed to the parent. This
pass takes O(|V |) time. In conclusion, the total running time
of TreePSNE is O(dmax|V |+ |E|) (see the Appendix for the
detailed algorithm).
Games on Arbitrary Graphs Finally, we present a heuris-
tic algorithm to find approximate PSNE for general BNPG
games. An approximate PSNE is defined as follow:
Definition 3.1. In a BNPG game an -PSNE is a vector
x∗ ∈ {0, 1}n such that:
Ui(x
∗
i , n
∗
−i) +  ≥ Ui(xi, n∗−i),
∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, where n∗i =
∑
j∈Ni x
∗
j and 0 ≤  ≤ 1.
The heuristic algorithm is composed of two subroutines.
The first one is termed as Asynchronous-BR, which is
based on the idea of best-response dynamics. In one execu-
tion of Asynchronous-BR, each player will sequentially
update her action with the best-response to all other players,
in an asynchronous manner. The second subroutine is termed
Evolve, and will execute Asynchronous-BR k times
and pick the minimum  such that in the associated action
profile x, every player has achieved an -PSNE. In this way,
Evolve finds the approximate PSNE with the best qual-
ity through best-response dynamics. Due to limited space,
the Asynchronous-BR and Evolve are provided in the
supplement. The heuristic algorithm to find an approximate
PSNE is given in Algorithm 3. The input δ is the stopping
criterion. When the distance d of two consecutive profiles is
small enough (< δ) the algorithm converges.
Algorithm 3 Heuristic to find approximate PSNE
1: Input: k, δ
2: Initialize: d = M .M : a large positive number
3: x← Random initializatioin
4: if x is a PSNE then return x
5: while d > δ do
6: x′ ← Evolve(x, k)
7: if x′ is a PSNE then
8: return x′
9: else
10: d← ||x′ − x||p
11: end if
12: end while
13: return x′
4 Homogeneous BNPG Games
Next, we consider homogeneous BNPG games where all the
players share the same function g. We begin by showing that
even in homogeneous BNPG games, a PSNE need not exit.
Existence of PSNE
We present a homogeneous game for which a PSNE does
not exist. This game has three players {1, 2, 3} and nodes
corresponding to the players form a simple path with player
2 in the middle. Specifically, c1 = 1, c2 = 2, and c3 = 3.
We set ∆g(0) = 1.5, ∆g(1) = 3.5, and ∆g(2) = 0.5, corre-
sponding to a certain function g that we can select arbitrarily.
There are a total of 8 possible action profiles of the game and
an action profile is a PSNE if and only if a specific set of
inequality constraints are satisfied. For example, the action
profile (1, 0, 1) is a PSNE if and only if c1 ≤ ∆g(0) and
c2 > ∆g(2) and c3 ≤ ∆g(0). By exhaustively checking all
8 profiles, it is not difficult to verify that none of the 8 sets of
inequality constraints is satisfied, meaning that a PSNE does
not exist in this game.
Complexity Next, we show that checking if a PSNE exists
for a homogeneous BNPG is hard. The hardness result fol-
lows from Theorem 10, where we show that determining the
existence of a PSNE in a special case of the homogeneous
BNPG is NP-complete.
Theorem 4. Determining the existence of a PSNE in a ho-
mogeneous BNPG game is NP-Complete.
Next, we consider further restrictions that enable strong
positive algorithmic results—far stronger than for the general
BNPG games.
Games on Complete Graphs
Computing a PSNE We now show that there always exists
a PSNE in homogeneous BNPG games on complete graphs,
and it can be computed in time O(n log n), in contrast to the
O(n2) algorithm for the general case.
Theorem 5. Every homogeneous BNPG game on a com-
plete graph has a PSNE, which can be computed in time
O(n log n).
Proof. Our proof is constructive. Without loss of generality,
suppose c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn (we can start by sorting players
in this order). If ∆g(0) < c1, we immediately obtain an equi-
librium where no player invests, since ci > ∆g(0) for every
i. If cn ≤ g(n − 1), every player invests is an equilibrium.
If neither of the two cases holds, we initialize x to all-zeros.
Since c1 ≤ ∆g(0), we set x1 = 1. For a subsequent player
i, we set xi = 1 if ci ≤ ∆g(ni). Note that ni in this case
is the number of players (who choose to invest) with index
smaller than i. We repeat this process for each player in as-
cending order of ci until we found a certain player m such
that cm > ∆g(nm). We then set the decisions of player m
and her subsequent players to 0. We argue that the resulting
action profile is a PSNE.
Note that in the above process, we have for player (m−1),
cm−1 ≤ ∆g(nm−1) = ∆g(m− 2), since nm−1 is the num-
ber of investing players preceding player (m− 1). For player
m, we have cm > ∆g(nm) = ∆g(m − 1). Now, for any
player i with i ≤ m − 1, we have ci ≤ ∆g(m − 2) since
ci ≤ cm−1. Thus, player i will not deviate from her current
decision, which is xi = 1. For any player j with j ≥ m,
we have cj > ∆g(m− 1). That is, player j would not devi-
ate from her current decision xj = 0. The resulting action
profile is then a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The proof
implies that the complexity of finding a PSNE is O(n log n),
dominated by the time to sort players in order of ci.
The proof of Theorem 5 is constructive and gives an algo-
rithm to find a PSNE. We term this algorithm SimpleSort.
In fact, SimpleSort outputs an equilibrium with a special
structure, where the first k players (in ascending order of
ci) will invest and the rest will not, for some k determined
by the algorithm. As this equilibrium is not unique, we next
characterize all PSNE of this game.
Characterizing all PSNE In order to characterize all equi-
libria, we classify these based on the number of players who
choose to invest in an equilibrium. For an equilibrium x∗,
let k be the number of player who choose to invest. We term
such an equilibrium a k-PSNE.
Let I(cond(ci)) be the index set of the players whose
associated ci satisfies a certain condition cond(ci). Given
a k-PSNE, for a player i who has chosen 1, we have ci ≤
∆g(k − 1) based on the condition in Eqn. (2). For a player
i who has chosen 0, we have ci > ∆g(k). Equivalently, if
ci > ∆g(k − 1) (respectively, ci ≤ ∆g(k)), we know that
player i has chosen 0 (respectively, 1). Based on this, given
any k, we can characterize all possible k-PSNE.
Proposition 6. When ∆g(k) > ∆g(k− 1), a k-PSNE exists
if and only if: (1) there is no ci such that ∆g(k − 1) <
ci ≤ ∆g(k) and (2) |I(ci ≤ ∆g(k− 1))| = k. The resulting
unique k-PSNE is that all players in the set I(ci ≤ ∆g(k −
1)) invest.
We introduce some notation. Let I+ = I(ci ≤ ∆g(k)),
I× = I(∆g(k) < ci ≤ ∆g(k − 1)), and I− = I(ci >
∆g(k − 1)). Let k+ = |I+|, k× = |I×|, and k− = |I−|.
Proposition 7. When ∆g(k) ≤ ∆g(k − 1), k-PSNE exists
if and only if k× + k+ ≥ k and k+ ≤ k. Specifically, let I×+
be an arbitrary subset of I× with cardinality k − k+. Then a
k-PSNE is that all players in the set I×+ ∪ I+ invest.
Proof. Consider a k-PSNE for a fixed integer k, where there
are k players decided to invest. Recall from Eqn. (2) that a
player i decides to report if and only if ci ≤ ∆gi(ni), where
ni is the number of i’s neighbors who decide to invest. As
the underlying graph is complete, ni is the total number of
investing players in the game excluding i. Note that for a
player i who decides to invest, ni = k − 1 while for a player
i who decides not to invest, ni = k. Then it is sufficient
to compare ci associated with each player to ∆g(k) and
∆g(k − 1).
Based on the investing condition in Eqn (2), we have ci ≤
∆g(k − 1) for the player i who decided to invest in a k-
PSNE. For a player i who decided not to invest, we have
ci > ∆g(k). Equivalently, for an arbitrary player i, we have
two observations:
• if ci > ∆g(k − 1), player i has decided to not to invest;
• if ci ≤ ∆g(k), player i has decided to invest.
Then to check the existence of k-PSNE, it is sufficient
to examine the above two conditions and check whether
there are exactly k players chosen to invest. We divide
the discussion into two cases: ∆g(k) > ∆g(k − 1) and
∆g(k) ≤ ∆g(k − 1), which corresponds to Proposition 5
and Proposition 6, respectively.
Case 1: When ∆g(k) > ∆g(k − 1), if there is a player
i such that ∆g(k − 1) < ci ≤ ∆g(k), a k-PSNE does not
exist. Moreover, a k-PSNE exists only if there are exactly k
players whose associated ci satisfies ci ≤ ∆g(k − 1). And
that k players reporting is a k-PSNE. This proves Proposition
5.
Case 2: When ∆g(k) ≤ ∆g(k− 1), the two values ∆g(k)
and ∆g(k − 1) divide the players into three sets based on ci:
I+ = I(ci ≤ ∆g(k)), I× = I(∆g(k) < ci ≤ ∆g(k − 1)),
and I− = I(ci > ∆g(k − 1)). Let k+ = |I+|, k× = |I×|,
and k− = |I−|. Then if a k-PSNE exists, all players in I+
will invest and all players in I− will not invest. Furthermore,
to ensure that there are exactly k players investing, there
should be exactly (k − k+) players in the set I× choosing to
invest. Thus, a k-PSNE exists if and only if k× + k+ ≥ k
and k+ ≤ k. This proves Proposition 6.
By considering all k from 0 to n, Proposition 6 and Propo-
sition 7 can fully characterize all possible PSNE in polyno-
mial time. We note that Proposition 7 shows that for a given
k, the number of possible k-PNSE could be exponential in
k×. However, we can pick one k-PNSE by arbitrarily (e.g.,
randomly) selecting a subset I×+ from I+.
The above two propositions also characterize the structure
of the equilibrium action profiles x∗, which is illustrated in
Fig. 2. Specifically, if we sort the players in ascending order
of ci, an equilibrium x∗ is divided into three regions. The
first (respectively, third) region corresponds to players who
choose 1 (respectively, 0) and the second region is a mixed
zone where some of the players choose 1 and others 0.
  
mix zoneinvest not invest
Figure 2: Structure of pure-strategy equilibria. Dark squares
denote investing players.
Social Welfare Social welfare is defined as the sum of utili-
ties of all players:
SW(x)
∆
=
n∑
i=1
Ui(xi, ni). (6)
A common goal is to seek the PSNE with maximum
social welfare—the socially optimal PSNE. Although the
SimpleSort algorithm can always find a PSNE, it is not
necessarily socially optimal. We now use the results in Propo-
sitions 6 and 7 to efficiently find a socially optimal PSNE.
For a specific k-PSNE, we have x∗i + n
∗
i = k, the same
for all players. Thus, the social welfare in a k-PSNE, denoted
as SW(x∗; k), can be rewritten as a linear function of x:
SW(x∗; k) = n · g(k)−
n∑
i=1
cix
∗
i . (7)
For a fixed k, there are two possible cases, i.e., ∆g(k) >
∆g(k− 1) or ∆g(k) ≤ ∆g(k− 1). For the first case, we can
efficiently compute a unique PSNE based on Proposition 6 if
it exists. For the second case, Proposition 7 states that in an
equilibrium, there are exactly (k − k+) players in the index
set I× choosing to invest. As SW(x∗; k) is linear in x, it is
maximized when we pick the top-(k − k+) players in the set
I× in ascending order of ci and set the corresponding decision
variables xi to 1. That is, for any k, we can either confirm that
a k-PSNE does not exist or efficiently compute the socially
optimal k-PSNE for that fixed k. Thus, by considering k from
0 to n, we can efficiently compute the socially optimal PSNE.
Fully Homogeneous Games on Arbitrary Graphs
In this section, we discuss equilibrium computation in BNPG
games with arbitrary graph structure. As demonstrated in
the counterexample above, a PSNE need not exist even if g
is homogeneous. We now consider the question for a more
restricted class of fully homogeneous BNPG games, where
all players share the parameters c. Further, we restrict g to be
strictly convex. In this case, we show that equilibria always
exist, and all equilibria can be computed efficiently.1 For this
discussion, let D be the maximum degree in G.
Since g is strictly convex, we have ∆g(0) < ∆g(1) <
· · · < ∆g(D). When c ≤ ∆g(0), all players investing is
a unique PSNE. When c > ∆g(0), there is a PSNE with
no one investing; however, other equilibria might exist. To
distinguish, we term the equilibriax∗ = 0 andx∗ = 1 as two
trivial equilibria, and others where at least one player (but not
all) invest are termed non-trivial. The non-trivial equilibria
are closely-related to a k-core of a graph. Specifically, a k-
core of a graph G is a maximal induced subgraph H of G,
where each node in H has degree at least k. We have the
following lemma from Bickle [2] charactering the k-core of
a graph.
Lemma 4.1 (Bickle [2]). Given an arbitrary graph G and
an integer k, if a k-core of G exists, it is unique.
The following theorem characterizes the relationship be-
tween a non-trivial PSNE and a k-core of the graph G.
Theorem 8. In a fully-homogeneous BNPG game with
strictly convex function g, let x be an action profile and
H be the subgraph of G induced from the nodes correspond-
ing to the investing players in x. If x is a non-trivial PSNE,
thenH is a k-core of G.
Proof. If x∗ is a non-trivial PSNE, then we have ∆g(k −
1) < c ≤ ∆g(k) for some integer k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , D}. Thus,
for an arbitrary player who chooses to invest in the equilib-
rium x∗, she must be connected to k other players who also
choose to invest. This holds for any player who invests in
1In this case, the game is a supermodular game [21, 18]. While
supermodular games always have a PSNE, computing one is not
necessarily efficient.
the equilibrium. As a result, the induced subgraph H has
minimum node degree at least k. Now, for any other node
v not in H, it represents a player who decides not to invest.
By the definition of equilibrium, the v must be connected to
fewer than k nodes inH; otherwise, the corresponding player
will change her action to invest. That is, adding v toH will
violate the condition that each node inH has at least degree
k, meaning thatH is maximal. Thus,H is a k-core of G.
Note that Theorem 8 does not guarantee the existence of
a non-trivial PSNE. It only states that if a non-trivial PSNE
exists, the corresponding induced subgraph is a k-core of G.
Thus, it provides a guideline to find a non-trivial PSNE for a
specific game – finding the k-core of the underlying graph.
Fortunately, a simple pruning algorithm can efficiently find
the k-core of a given graph provided that it exists. Specifically,
given a graph G and an integer k, the pruning algorithm will
remove all the nodes that have degree less than k iteratively
until no more nodes can be removed. If the remaining set of
nodes is not empty, the resulting subgraph is a k-core; other-
wise, a k-core does not exist. Moreover, if a k-core exists, the
corresponding non-trivial PSNE is unique from Lemma 4.1.
Now we are able to fully characterize the equilibria in a fully
homogeneous BNPG game.
Corollary 9. For a fully homogeneous BNPG game parame-
terized by (c, g), where g is strictly convex, we have:
• when c ≤ ∆g(0), x∗ = 1 is a unique trivial PSNE;
• when c > ∆g(D), x∗ = 0 is a unique trivial PSNE;
• otherwise, there is always one trivial PSNE x∗ = 0 and
possibly one non-trivial PSNE corresponding to the unique
k-core of graph G, where k satisfies ∆g(k − 1) < c ≤
∆g(k).
The algorithm to find all possible equilibria is then straight-
forward. Given a fully homogeneous game, we can check if
there is an integer k such that ∆g(k − 1) < c ≤ ∆g(k). If
it is the case, we can use the pruning algorithm to find the
k-core of graph G (if it exists), corresponding to a non-trivial
PSNE. For the other two special cases, we can find the two
trivial PSNE. As there are at most two PSNE of the game,
we can easily identify the socially optimal equilibrium. Fi-
nally, we show that convexity of g(·) is necessary to find all
equilibria of this game in polynomial time.
Theorem 10. In a fully-homogeneous BNPG game with gen-
eral function g, determining the existence of a PSNE is NP-
Complete.
Proof. Given an action profile x it takes polynomial time to
certify if it is a PSNE, so the problem is in NP. When x = 0
or 1 it takes polynomial time to check if it is a PSNE. Thus,
we consider the problem to determine if there is a non-trivial
x (x 6= 0 and 1) such that it is a PSNE. We construct a
reduction from the K-CLIQUE (KC) problem. Given a graph
G = (V ′, E′), the KC problem asks if there is a clique of
size at least k in G. For an arbitrary instance KC(G, k), we
construct a graphH = (V,E). First, we add a clique of size
M to H, where M is a large integer satisfying M  |V ′|.
The M nodes are denoted by a set T . For every node i ∈ T
we connect it to every node in V ′.
Next, we specify a homogeneous BNPG on H. Let the
players in T ∪ V ′ share the same cost c. For each player
i ∈ T ∪ V ′ the best-response policy is
xi =

1, ni = k − 1 +M
0, ni = k − 1 +M
0, otherwise,
(8)
where the player is indifferent between investing and not
investing when ni = k − 1 +M . The best-response policy
above is realizable, for example, by a function g(x) satisfying
∆g(x) = c when x = k − 1 + M and ∆g(x) = α when
x 6= k − 1 +M , where 0 < α < c.
Suppose a k-clique in G is given. Denote the players in
this k-clique by S. We claim that letting the players in S ∪ T
invest and others not invest is a non-trivial PSNE. For a player
i ∈ S, she is connected to the M investing players in T , as
well as the other k − 1 investing players in S, which means
ni = k − 1 +M and she will not deviate. Similar argument
shows that for any player t ∈ T she will not deviate because
nt = k − 1 + M . For a player j ∈ V ′ \ S, the number nj
of her investing neighbors falls into one of the three cases:
nj > k − 1 +M , nj = k − 1 +M , and nj < k − 1 +M ,
so she will not deviate.
Another direction is to show that given a non-trivial PSNE
x, there is a clique of size at least k in G. First, there must
be at least one investing player since the PSNE is non-trivial.
Next, we argue there must be at least one investing player
in T . If all the players in T were not investing, then for any
player i ∈ V ′ we have ni < k − 1 + M , so all players in
V ′ ∪ T would not invest, which contradicts the fact that x is
a non-trivial PSNE. Furthermore, We claim that all players
in T are investing players. Suppose the set T is partitioned
into two disjoint sets T = S1 ∪ S0, where players in S1
invest while players in S0 not. Then for any player i ∈ S1
we have ni = k − 1 + M . Since M is a large integer, S0
must be an empty set, otherwise the player i cannot have
enough investing neighbors. Due to the best-response policy
in Eq. (8), there are exactly k investing players in V ′, which
are denoted by S. For any player i ∈ S we know ni =
k − 1 + M , so the player i must be connected to the other
k − 1 players in S, which shows that S is a k-clique.
5 Experiments
In this section we conducted experiments to show the effec-
tiveness of Algorithm 3 for finding approximate PSNE in
general BNPG games. The parameters ci are sampled from
the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. In our experiments we as-
sume gi = λihi where λi is sampled uniformly at random
on [0, 1], and hi are either convex or concave, corresponding
to strategic substitutes and complements, respectively [11].
If gi(x) is convex, it is sampled from a set of convex func-
tions {−α log (x+ 1)β} by uniformly at random sampling
α and β from {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9} and {1.2, 1.5, 2.0}, re-
spectively. Similarly, if gi(x) is concave it is sampled from a
set of concave functions {−αxβ} by sampling α and β from
the same sets. We normalize the values of the utility functions
Ui to [0, 1] when evaluating the approximation quality of an
-PSNE. In each simulated game, we feature a mix of players
with concave and convex gi. This mix is determined using a
parameter γ ∈ [0, 1], which is the probability that a particular
player i’s gi is concave; consequently, higher γ implies a
larger fraction of the population with convex utility functions.
For each value of γ we simulated 1000 BNPG games. We
first conduct experiments on a Facebook network [16], which
is a connected graph with 4093 nodes and 88234 edges. Then,
we experiment on synthetic networks to study the impact of
network topologies on the fraction of players reporting in
PSNE.
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Figure 3: Averaged  of the approximate PSNE (in % units).
Facebook network The experimental results are shown in
Figure 3, where we vary γ. Each bar is the averaged  of the
approximate PSNE computed using Algorithm 3. We omit
the two corner cases of γ = 0 and γ = 1 because in all of
these instances our algorithm returned an exact PSNE. The
main takeaway from these results is two-fold: first, that even
when populations are mixed so that a PSNE is not guaranteed
to exist, there is usually an approximate PSNE with a small
 (maximum benefit from deviation), and second, that our
heuristic algorithm finds good approximate PSNE (observe
that even outliers have  < 0.02).
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.00.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
in
ve
st
in
g 
ra
ti
o
1.2
1.5
2.0
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.00.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
in
ve
st
in
g 
ra
ti
o 1.2
1.5
2.0
Figure 4: Ratio of investing players when γ = 0 (left) and
γ = 1 (right).
Next, we study the impact of our three parameters, α, β,
and γ, on the fraction of players reporting in PSNE. Figure 4
presents the results for γ = 0 (left) and γ = 1 (right) (these
are the two cases where we can compute the exact PSNE, as
mentioned above). We can note that in both cases, increas-
ing α or β leads to increasing fraction of investing players.
This is because higher values of either increase the rate of
change of the utility function as more players invest, and con-
sequently network effects lead to higher overall investment.
The most dramatic difference, however, is between γ = 0
and γ = 1. In the former case, a relatively small fraction
ultimately invest, whereas γ = 1 leads to a great deal of equi-
librium investment, particularly for sufficiently large α and β.
This is because convex gi imply that as more players invest,
the marginal benefits to investment increase, and therefore
equilibrium may be seen as a cascade of investment decisions
that ultimately captures most of the community.
Synthetic networks We conduct experiments on two types
of synthetic networks. The first type is the Barabasi-Albert
network (BA) [1]. BA is characterized by its power-law de-
gree distribution, where connectivity is heavily skewed to-
wards high-degree nodes. The power-law degree distribution,
P (k) ∼ k−r, gives the probability that a randomly selected
node has k neighbors. We consider three variants of the BA
network with different exponents r. We also experiment on
Small-World (SW) network [23]. The Small-World network
is well-known for balancing shortest path distance between
pairs of nodes and local clustering in a way as to qualitatively
resemble real networks. We consider three variants of the SW
network, where they differ in the local clustering coefficients.
The details about BA and SW networks are listed in Table 2.
We use the same experimental setup as the one for Facebook
network. Note that we only consider γ = 0 and γ = 1, where
a PSNE can always be found by Algorithm 3. When γ = 1, a
player has higher incentive to invest as more neighbors invest,
while the incentive structure is the opposite when γ = 0.
BA-1 BA-2 BA-3
exponent r 2.7167 2.2789 2.0374
SW-1 SW-2 SW-3
local clustering coeff. 0.3667 0.3893 0.4070
Table 2: Details about the BA and SW networks.
The experimental results on BA networks are showed in
Figure 5. The columns from left to right correspond to results
on BA-1, BA-2, and BA-3. Note that as r decreases it is more
likely to have high-degree nodes. The top row (resp. bottom
row) is the case where γ = 0 (resp. γ = 1). At the bottom
row, when α and β are fixed, there are more high-degree
nodes as r decreases, thus the investing decisions of these
high-degree nodes can encourage more nodes to invest, which
results in an overall increasing trend to invest. The results at
the top row have the opposite trend, where more free riders
occur due to the increase of high-degree nodes, which leads
to an overall decreasing trend to invest. The experimental
results for SW networks are showed in Figure 6. The columns
from left to right correspond to results on SW-1, SW-2, and
SW-3. Note that a larger local clustering coefficient leads to
denser local structures. Intuitively, when γ = 1, an investing
player’s decision can encourage more neighbors to invest
as the local structure becomes denser. On the other hand,
when γ = 0, a denser local structure can also lead to more
free riders. This intuition is supported by the overall trend
exhibited in Figure 6.
6 Conclusion
We study binary networked public goods games from an al-
gorithmic perspective. We show that pure strategy equilibria
may not exist even in highly restricted cases, and check-
ing equilibrium existence is computationally hard in general.
However, we exhibit a number of important special cases in
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Figure 5: Ratio of investing players when γ = 0 (top row)
and γ = 1 (bottom row) on BA networks. From left to right:
BA-1, BA-2, and BA-3.
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Figure 6: Ratio of investing players when γ = 0 (top row)
and γ = 1 (bottom row) on Small-World networks. From left
to right: SW-1, SW-2, and SW-3.
which such equilibria exist, can be efficiently computed, and
even where socially optimal equilibria can also be efficiently
found. Finally, we presented a heuristic approach for approx-
imately solving such games, shown to be highly effective in
our experiments.
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Appendix
Algorithms for Asynchronous-BR and Evolve
Algorithm 4 Asynchronous-BR
1: Input: x
2: for i = 1, · · · , n do
3: if ∆gi(ni) ≥ ci then
4: xi = 1
5: else
6: xi = 0
7: end if
8: end for
Algorithm 5 Evolve
1: Input: x, k
2: Initialize: ′ = M,x′ = 0 . M : a large positive number
3: for i = 1, · · · , k do
4: ← MAXEPSILON(x) . MAXEPSILON(x): maximum deviation of x from being a PSNE
5: if  = 0 then return x end if . Found a PSNE
6: if  < ′ then ′ =  and x′ = x end if
7: x← Asynchronous-BR(x)
8: end for
9: return x′
Algorithm TreePSNE
Algorithm 6 TreePSNE
1: Input: a BNPG game (G,U).
2: Initialize: TR
3: Compute a Depth-first order O (start with leaves and end with the root)
4: for Y in O do
5: if Y is the root then
6: Compute n′R conditioned on xR.
7: Compute the best responses of the root by a modified version of Algorithm 2.
8: else if Y is a leaf node then
9: Compute the conditonal best-response table TY by Algorithm 1.
10: Pass TY to its parent
11: else Y is an internal node
12: Compute the conditonal best-response table TY by Algorithm 2.
13: Pass TY to its parent
14: end if
15: end for
16: Let Oˆ be the reversed Depth-first order.
17: for Y in Oˆ do
18: if Y is the root then
19: Choose an action xR ∈ TR.
20: Determine the actions of its children by the best-responses tables passed from them.
21: else if Y is a leaf node then
22: Pass
23: else Y is an internal node
24: Determine the actions of its children by the best-responses tables passed from them.
25: end if
26: end for
27: Return: A PSNE consists of the actions of the nodes.
